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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Jerry Lee McClain appeals from his conviction for violation of a no-contact
order, domestic violence in the presence of a child, and intimidating a witness
with a persistent violator enhancement.

On appeal, McClain challenges the

sufficiency of the evidence supporting his persistent violator enhancement.
Additionally,

McClain contends the district court erred by admitting an

unredacted version of an interrogation.

Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings
McClain repeatedly kicked, hit and slapped his wife, Janna McClain,
during a sexual encounter while their young son was asleep in his bedroom
within hearing distance.

(11/10/2012 JT Tr., p.178, L.9 - p.188, L.17.)

The

state charged McClain with rape and felony domestic battery. (38576 R., pp.2527.) After McClain was arrested on those charges, he called Janna from jail and
asked her to "speak to the prosecutors" and "change her story." (11/10/2012 JT
Tr., p.196, Ls.7-20.) The state charged McClain with intimidating a witness and
violation of a no contact order.

(38577 R., pp.26-7.) The state subsequently

filed a sentencing enhancement alleging McClain had previously been convicted
of two or more felonies.

(38577 R., pp.33-35.)

The criminal cases were

consolidated for trial. (38577 R., p.32.)
The state filed a motion in limine seeking to introduce evidence of "[t]he
history of domestic violence in the relationship [between McClain and his wife],
including the power and control [McClain] exercised over the victim daily, and the
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prior incidents of domestic violence," asserting they were "both relevant and
probative to the case at hand." (38576 R., p.97.)

After a hearing on the motion,

the district court concluded:
[I]n the context of this case, because the state's evidence is so
strong without it and the likelihood of unfair prejudice to the
defendant in this case outweighs the relatively slight relevance of
this information, I'm not going to let it in on the state's case in chief.
(10/14/2010 Tr., p.43, Ls.5-10.)
Before the trial began, McClain objected to the introduction by the state of
a video of his interrogation by law enforcement (11/08/2012 JT Tr., p.56, L.22 p.58, L.13), claiming the 68 minute video related, almost in its entirety, "to other
events, acts, and wrongs other than the night in question" (11/08/2010 JT Tr.,
p.57, Ls.6-8). The state argued it had already redacted the video in accordance
with the court's previous evidentiary ruling and there were no "mentions of any
prior acts of violence" between the McClains, nor any "mention of the cycle of
power and controL" (11/08/2010 JT Tr., p.58, Ls.21-24.) The court indicated it
would review the video at a later time and "rule accordingly with instructions to
the state either to redact or not." (11/08/2010 JT Tr., p.65, Ls.2-4.) Before ruling
on the admissibility of the video, the court granted McClain's motion for mistrial
after Janna volunteered testimony that violated the court's earlier ruling
prohibiting the introduction of evidence of the volatile and controlling nature of
McClain's relationship with Janna. (11/08/2010 JT Tr., p.100, L.17 - p.105, L.6.)
Prior to the start of the second trial, the court had time to review the video
of McClain's police interrogation. (11/10/2010 JT Tr., p.13, Ls.10-14.) The court
denied McClain's request to exclude the first 57 minutes and 20 seconds of the
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video finding the evidence relevant and the unfair prejudice to McClain was not
outweighed by that relevance. (11/10/2010 JT Tr., p.13, Ls.15-23.) The court
also denied McClain's request to exclude the last four minutes of the video,
agreeing with the state that the statements therein were relevant to McClain's
attack on the credibility of the witnesses against him. (11/10/2010 JT Tr., p.18,
L.9 - p.19, L.15.)

During the second trial, McClain again objected to the

introduction of the video based on his claim that it was "fraught with references to
prior acts or wrongs." (11/12/2010 JT Tr., p.224, Ls.6-8.) The state stood on its
previous response to McClain's objection and the court's previous ruling that the
video was admissible in its entirety. (11/12/2010 JT Tr., p.226, Ls.22-25.) The
court stood by its previous ruling and allowed the introduction of the video
interrogation of McClain. (11/12/2010 JT Tr., p.227, Ls.1-2.)
The jury ultimately found McClain guilty of felony domestic violence,
intimidation of a witness, and violation of a no contact order. (38576 R., pp.146147; 38577 R., pp.92-93; 11/10/2010 JT Tr., p.397, L.1 - p.398, L.12.) The trial
immediately moved

to the

production

of evidence

on

the sentencing

enhancement wherein state's exhibits 62 and 63, identified as "certified
judgments of conviction," were admitted by stipulation.
pA05, L.15 - pA06, L.2.)

(11/10/2010 JT Tr.,

Exhibit 62 was a certified judgment of conviction

showing McClain had been convicted of possession of a controlled substance in
Canyon County. (11/10/2010 JT Tr., pA07, Ls.1-9.) Exhibit 63 was described to
the jury by the state as follows:
Then referring to State's Exhibit 63, this is a little bit more
difficult to read. You can see up at the top of the certified judgment
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of conviction that it was entered in Malheur County, Oregon. You
can see the defendant's name, Jerry Lee McClain. You can see
the case number there. You can see that he was convicted of
assault number three - or assault in the third degree.
And then up in the corner, you can see that the judgment of
conviction was entered on August 21 of 1991.
And then if you flip back to the page that contains the
indictment in this case, which is also part of the judgment of
conviction here, you can see that this is a felony. In Count I, it
specifically states there "unlawfully, feloniously, and intentionally."
And, again, this is all part of State's Exhibit 63. And these
are self-authenticating documents, so you can consider them as
true and correct copies."
(11/10/2010 JT Tr., p.407, L.23 - p.408, L.19.) McClain argued to the jury that
exhibit 63 did not prove that the conviction out of Oregon was for a felony:
Going back to the first page, he was found - he was
convicted of the following offense: Assault third degree.
It does not indicate whether that is a felony or misdemeanor
charge. I don't see that on the document. Here the state has to
prove that both of these charges are felonies.
(11/10/2010 JT Tr., p.409, Ls.4-10.)

The state countered this argument with

reference to the indictment: "[Y]ou can see, referring to this document, the
indictment, that this is a felony." (11/10/2010 JTTr., p.409, Ls.18-20.)
During deliberation of the Part II, the jury sent a question to the court
which asked, "Is the most serious level of misdemeanor Class A[?]" (11/10/2010
JT Tr., p.426, Ls.4-5.) Before the court could respond to the jury's question, the
jury came back with a verdict finding McClain had previously been convicted of
the two alleged felonies. (11/10/2010 JT Tr., p.426, L.6 - p.428, L.6; 38576 R.,
p.148, 38577 R., p.94.) McClain filed a motion for judgment of acquittal, claiming

4

the state failed to present sufficient evidence to support the verdict on the Part II.
(38576 R., pp.202-204, 38577 R., pp.95-97.) The court denied the motion for
judgment of acquittal (38576 R., pp.207-209; 38577 R., pp.98-100) and
sentenced McClain to concurrent enhanced unified sentences of 10 years fixed
followed by 10 years indeterminate for intimidating a witness and felony domestic
battery, and one year on the violation of a no contact order. (38576 R., pp.226228; 38577 R., pp.109-111.)
McClain timely appeals. (38576 R., pp.229-232; 38577 R., pp.112-115.)
The criminal cases have been consolidated for purposes of this appeal. (38576
R., pp.2-3.)
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ISSUES
McClain states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the State present insufficient evidence to support the
jury's finding that Mr. McClain was a persistent violator?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it admitted the
un-redacted copy of Mr. McClain's interrogation?

(Appellant's brief, p.6.)
The state wishes to rephrase the issues on appeal as:
1.

Was there substantial competent evidence to support the jury's verdict
finding McClain guilty of being a persistent violator?

2.

Has McClain failed to establish that the district court erred in admitting the
video of his interrogation?
.
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ARGUMENT

I.
McClain Has Failed To Establish The Evidence Was Insufficient To Support The
JUry'S Verdict Of Guilty On The Persistent Violator Enhancement
A.

Introduction
McClain asserts there was insufficient evidence presented to support the

jury's verdict finding him guilty of being a persistent violator. (Appellant's Brief,
pp.7-10.) Specifically, McClain contends "the information regarding the prior
conviction in Oregon was not sufficient to support his conviction." (Appellant's
brief, p.7.) A review of the record shows McClain is incorrect.

B.

Standard Of Review
"Appellate review of the sufficiency of evidence is limited in scope." State

v. Marsh, 2011 WL 6430816 *4 (Ct. App. 2011). An appellate court will not set
aside a judgment of conviction entered upon a jury verdict if there is substantial
evidence upon which a rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Mi"er, 131 Idaho
288, 292, 955 P.2d 603, 607 (Ct. App. 1997); State v. Reyes, 121 Idaho 570,
826 P.2d 919 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Hart, 112 Idaho 759,761,735 P.2d 1070,
1072 (Ct. App. 1987).

In conducting this review the appellate court will not

substitute its view for that of the jury as to the credibility of witnesses, the weight
to be given to the testimony, or the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the
evidence. Mi"er, 131 Idaho at 292,955 P.2d at 607; State v. Knutson, 121 Idaho
101,822 P.2d 998 (Ct. App. 1991); Hart, 112 Idaho at 761,735 P.2d at 1072.
Moreover, the facts, and inferences to be drawn from those facts, are construed
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in favor of upholding the jury's verdict. Miller, 131 Idaho at 292, 955 P.2d at 607;
Hart, 112 Idaho at 761, 735 P.2d at 1072.

C.

McClain Has Failed To Establish That Exhibit 63 Does Not Constitute
Substantial, Competent Evidence That He Was Previously Convicted Of
Felony Third Degree Assault For Purposes Of The Persistent Violator
Enhancement
Idaho law provides for a sentencing enhancement for "[a]ny person

convicted for the third time of the commission of a felony[.]" Idaho Code § 192514.

Idaho Criminal Jury Instruction 1601 requires a jury to unanimously

determine if the evidence presented supports the state's contention that the
defendant has been convicted of felony offenses on at least two prior occasions.
The jury in the instant case was so instructed:
Ladies and gentlemen, we're prepared now to proceed on
Part II of the Information.
So, I'm going to read you the Amended Information Part II.
It reads as follows:
"Greg H. Bower, prosecuting attorney in and for the County
of Ada, State of Idaho, who in the name of and by the authority of
said state prosecutes in its behalf, in proper person comes now
before the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State
of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada, and given the court to
understand it to be further informed that as Part II of the
Information on file herein, the Defendant Jerry Lee McClain is a
persistent violator of the law in that the defendant has heretofore
been convicted of two or more felonies, to wit, number one, that the
said Defendant Jerry Lee McClain, on or about the date, 3rd day of
July, 2002, was convicted of the crime of possession of a controlled
substances, a felony, in the County of Canyon, State of Idaho, by
virtue of that certain judgment of conviction made and entered by
the Honorable Judge Kerrick in Case No. CR-01-020285 C.
"Count 2, that the said Defendant Jerry Lee McClain, on or
about the 21 st day of August in 1991, was convicted of the crime of
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assault in the third degree, a felony in the County of Malheur, State
of Oregon.
"Wherefore, the said defendant, having been convicted
previously of two or more felonies, should be considered a
persistent violator of the law and should be sentenced accordingly
pursuant to Idaho Code 19-2514 upon conviction of the charge or
charges contained in Part I of the Information.
"Dated this 29 th of June 2012, signed by Ada County
Prosecuting Attorney."
Ladies and gentlemen, a moment ago I read you a jury
instruction letting you know that having found the defendant guilty
of two of these predicate offenses, the state now alleges that the
defendant has these two prior felony convictions.
The burden is on the state to prove your unanimous
satisfaction and beyond a reasonable doubt to each and every one
of the allegations contained in Part " of the Information as I just
read to you.
(11/10/2010JTTr., p.402, L.19-p.404, L.17.)
In support of its allegation that McClain was a persistent violator, the state
offered two certified judgments of conviction, identified as Exhibits 62 and 63.
(11/10/2010 JT Tr., p.405, L.15 - p.406, L.2.) Based on this evidence, the jury
convicted McClain of being a persistent violator. (38576 R., p.148, 38577 R.,
p.94.)

On appeal, McClain asserts the evidence admitted was insufficient to

prove McClain had been convicted of two prior felonies because Exhibit 63 did
not establish "that assault in the third degree was a felony." (Appellant's brief,
p.10.) A review of the record shows McClain's claim is without merit for two
reasons.

First, because the record before this Court is insufficient to show

exactly what the Oregon judgment of conviction stated, it must be presumed to
support the district court's ruling denying McClain's motion for a judgment of
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acquittal for insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict of guilt on the
sentencing enhancement. Additiona"y, the state did provide the necessary proof
at trial, that being the fact of the prior conviction.
Exhibit 63 was offered and admitted by stipulation as a self-authenticating
document. (11/10/2010 JT Tr., p.405, L.15 - p.406, L.3.)

McClain argued at

trial that the judgment of conviction did not indicate whether the aggravated
assault in the third degree of which he was convicted was a misdemeanor or a
felony and, as such, was insufficient evidence to support a finding that McClain
had committed a prior felony offense. (11/10/2010 JT Tr., p.409, Ls.4-10.)
The exhibit list from McClain's jury trial identifies State's Exhibit 63 as a
judgment of conviction out of Malheur County. (Exhibits, p.1.) Although referred
to at trial as including an indictment as we" as a certified copy of judgment of
conviction (11/10/2010 JT Tr., p.408, Ls.10-19), Exhibit 63 as included in the
record before this Court consists only of an indictment from Malheur County for
the offense of assault in the first degree.

(Exhibits, pp.126-128.)

McClain

indicates on appeal he filed a motion to augment contemporaneously with his
brief to include the judgment of conviction (Appe"ant's brief, p.8, n.2), however,
none was filed. Because this Court does not presume error, this missing portion
of the record must be presumed to support the court's decision denying
McClain's motion for judgment of acquittal.

State v. Mowrey, 128 Idaho 804,

805,919 P.2d 333, 334 (1996) (missing portions of record presumed to support
decision of trial court).
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Even on the present record, McClain's claim of an inadequate record to
support the jury's finding of guilt on the persistent violator sentencing
enhancement fails.

A persistent violator enhancement pursuant to I.C. § 19-

2514 applies to "[a]ny person convicted for the third time of a commission of a
felony." The former convictions relied upon to support the persistent violator
enhancement must be alleged in the indictment or information and proved at
trial.

State v. Medrain, 143 Idaho 329, 332, 14 P.3d 34, 37 (Ct. App. 2006)

(citing State v. Cheatham, 139 Idaho 413,416,80 P.3d 349, 352 (Ct. App. 2003)
and State v. Martinez, 102 Idaho 875, 880, 643 P.2d 555, 560 (Ct. App. 1982».
Although the Court of Appeals' holding in State v. Williams, 103 Idaho 635, 647,
651 P.2d 569, 581 (Ct. App. 1982), required a showing by the state at trial on a
persistent violator sentencing enhancement "that the prior convictions were for
felonies under the laws of the state where the offenses occurred," in order to
prove the persistent violator enhancement, the state was only required to
produce certified copies of judgments indicating McClain had previously been
convicted of two prior felonies.

I.C. § 19-2514; I.R.E. 803(8), 902(4); see

Medrain, 143 Idaho at 333, 144 P.3d at 37 ("a certified copy of a judgment of
conviction" along with evidence establishing identity of person formerly convicted
is sufficient to prove persistent violator enhancement); State v. Smith, 116 Idaho
553, 560, 777 P.2d 1226, 1233 (Ct. App. 1989) (in order to prove persistent
violator enhancement, "the state needed only to produce copies of judgments
specifically identifying the crimes as felonies, or - if the judgments were not so
specific - to offer admissible copies of the felony statutes applicable to the
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crimes recited in the judgments"). The evidence before this jury was sufficient to
make the finding.
Here, the evidence admitted by stipulation at trial by the state to prove
McClain had a prior felony conviction from the state of Oregon consisted of a
certified copy of a judgment of conviction indicating McClain had been convicted
of an assault in the third degree and an indictment for the original charge of
assault in the first degree and delivery of an imitation controlled substance.
(Exhibits, pp. 1, 126-128.) Exhibit 63 as found in this Court's record consists of
the indictment which reads McClain did "unlawfu"y, feloniously and intentionally
cause serious physical injury" to another with a "dangerous weapon." (Exhibits,
p.126.)

The information specifically states the conduct was done "unlawfu"y,

feloniously, and intentiona"y."

(11/10/2010 JT Tr., p.408, Ls.11-15.)

The

evidence before the jury included the fact that McClain was charged with a felony
assault charge for using a dangerous weapon on another person and that
McClain was convicted of an assault of a different degree.
McClain does not claim he was not convicted of an assault for using a
dangerous weapon on another person.

He does not argue the evidence

insufficient to establish he is the individual listed on the indictment or the
judgment of conviction.

He does not dispute the charge involved an assault

against a person with a dangerous weapon. McClain only asserts it is unclear
from the judgment of conviction taken with the indictment whether or not he was
convicted of a felony.

Because the information regarding the nature of the

offense charged by indictment coupled with the information from the judgment
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clearly identifies McClain's prior assault conviction as a felony, McClain has
failed to establish the state presented insufficient evidence to support the jury's
verdict finding him guilty of being a persistent violator.

II.
McClain Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred in Admitting The
Unredacted Video of McClain's Interrogation With Law Enforcement

Introduction

A.

McClain asserts the district court erred in admitting a copy of an
interrogation contrary to its prior ruling finding evidence of McClain's prior bad
acts inadmissible.

(Appellant's brief, pp.11-17.)

McClain's argument fails

because it is unsupported by the record.

B.

Standard Of Review
Rulings under !.R.E. 404(b) are reviewed under a bifurcated standard:

whether the evidence is admissible for a purpose other than propensity is given
free review while the determination of whether the probative value of the
evidence is substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 51, 205 P.3d
1185,1187 (2009); State v. Cross, 132 Idaho 667,670,978 P.2d 227, 230
(1999).

C.

McClain Has Failed To Establish Error In The Admission Of His
Interrogation At Trial
Evidence of prior bad acts is admissible if (a) it is relevant for any purpose

other than to prove the defendant's character in order to show he acted in
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conformity therewith, and (b) the potential prejudice associated with proof of
character does not substantially outweigh the proper probative value of the
evidence. LR.E. 404(b); State v. Cross, 132 Idaho 667, 670, 978 P.2d 227, 230
(1999). The first prong of this test is met if the evidence is admissible for any
purpose other than proving character and actions in conformity therewith,
including proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident. LR.E. 404(b); State v. Phillips, 123
Idaho 178, 845 P.2d 1211 (1993); State v. Gauna, 117 Idaho 83,87,785 P.2d
647, 651 (Ct. App. 1989). The second prong of this test only excludes evidence
if the danger of unfair prejudice from having the jury conclude the defendant is of
bad character substantially outweighs its proper probative value.

State v.

Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 275-276, 77 P.3d 956, 964-965 (2003). This weighing
process is "committed to the judge's sound discretion." State v. Buzzard, 110
Idaho 800,802,718 P.2d 1238, 1240 (Ct. App. 1986).
McClain

asserts on

appeal the

interrogation

recording

contained

statements of McClain's prior bad acts in violation of the court's prior ruling that
such evidence was inadmissible.

(Appellant's brief, p.12.)

The specific

statements complained of include McClain's acknowledgment "that he had put
his kids through a bunch of 'bullshit' before," a statement that McClain's wife had
hurt him and he has "hurt people," and he has "been that person before" when
asked about his capability to snap under certain circumstances.
brief, pp.12-13.)

(Appellant's

McClain asserts the court failed to properly analyze the

evidence at question and erred by simply asserting "that will be the ruling of the
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court."

(Appellant's brief, p.13.)

McClain fails to consider the fact the court

previously conducted the analysis when making its initial ruling on his objection.
Before the beginning of the first jury trial, the court heard argument on the
state's motion in limine regarding evidence of prior bad acts. The court ruled
that, although slightly relevant, evidence that McClain exercised control over his
victim throughout their relationship was not admissible in the state's case in chief
because of the risk of unfair prejudice to McClain. (10/14/2010 Tr., p.39, L.4p.43, L.10.) As the first trial began, McClain argued an already redacted copy of
his interrogation was not sufficiently redacted and requested the court order
further redaction in accordance with its previous Rule 403 ruling. (11/08/2010 JT
Tr., p.56, L.22 - p.58, L.13.) Both parties made argument to the court with the
understanding that, the court would rule on whether further redaction was
required after it had the opportunity to review the video.

(11/08/2010 JT Tr.,

p.65, Ls.2-4.) The trial began and ultimately ended in mistrial after the second of
the state's witnesses took the stand and volunteered testimony that violated the
court's

prior evidentiary ruling

disallowing evidence

of prior bad

acts.

(11/08/2010 JT Tr., p.103, L.23 - p.1 05, p.6.)
As the second trial began two days later, the court indicated it had
reviewed the 68 minute video previously argued by McClain to be inadmissible.
Although McClain asserts on appeal there was no analysis by the court before
ruling the video admissible (Appellant's brief, p.13), he overlooks the discussion
on the record prior to jury selection in the second trial:
THE COURT:
The court was able to view the 68-minute
video, and there had been a defense motion in limine requesting
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that the court exclude the first 57 minutes and 20 seconds of the
video as well as the final 4 minutes of the video.
The first 57 minutes and 20 seconds contains relevant
evidence on elements of one or more matters upon which the state
has the burden of proof. And the evidence is relevant, and I do not
believe that consideration of waste of time or unfair prejudice to the
defendant outweighs that relevance. Therefore, the motion to
exclude the first 57 minutes and 20 seconds of the video is denied.
The final 4 minutes, though, I would like to hear more
argument on that issue. What is your objection precisely to the
final 4 minutes, Mr. McKenzie?
MR. MCKENZIE [defense counsel]: Judge, and I don't know if this
was clear before.
In that earlier portion where [Detective]
Brechwald is stating, "This is what Janna [McClain] told me and this
is the truth," or where he says, referring to the bruising, like at 49
minutes and 25 seconds, "These are bruising [sic] that can only be
caused by someone suffering from domestic violence."
THE COURT:

Oh, no kidding. I guess I didn't pick up on that.

MR MCKENZIE:
those occur.

Well, I could point out the exact minutes where

THE COURT:
So it's the police officer interrogating the
defendant and making the statement?
MR MCKENZIE:
Right. So like at 38 minutes, 30 seconds, to 44
minutes, Brechwald speculates as to the source and timing of the
bruising.
THE COURT:

And you say Brechwald, that's the policeman?

MR. MCKENZIE:

The detective.

THE COURT:
minutes, right?

So 38 minutes to [sic] 30 seconds to 44

MR. MCKENZIE:

Right.

THE COURT:
bruises.

And he is speculating as to the cause of the

16

MR. MCKENZIE:
Source and
hearsay statements from Janna;
physical evidence such as MRI.
detective says the state does
because it has physical evidence.

timing of bruising, refers to
claims that the state has certain
At 44 minutes, 35 seconds, the
not need Janna as a witness

From 44 minutes to 47 minutes, Detective Brechwald
discussed this more as hearsay statements, asserts that it is
obvious that the defendant is lying. Again says the state has
certain physical evidence, including MRI, and says that the
defendant's explanation is not reasonable.
All those things are opinion evidence he wouldn't be able to
offer on the stand and shouldn't come in.
And then at 49 minutes, 25 seconds, the detective
speculates that bruising came from Janna being shaken, which I
don't even think is asserted by any party, Judge. And from then on
there's quite a bit of the detective discussing just in general men in
America need to be taking responsibility for their actions. That the
defendant needs to take responsibility.
And then the last 4 minutes from 64 to the end, there's some
general discussion, and the detective says, "You're going to have a
difficult time selling your story to other people." There's more
discussion about possible motives of Janna and her mother and
discussion unrelated to [the night of the incident].

(11/10/2010JTTr., p.13, L.10-p.16, L.10.)
The state countered McClain's argument, calling it a mischaracterization
in some respects. (11/10/2010 JT Tr., p.16, Ls.17-20.) The state asserted the
detective confronted McClain with physical evidence as an interrogation
technique and discussed with him the motives of the witnesses against him to lie.

(11/10/2010 JT Tr., p.16, L.31 - p.17, L.s 18.) The final four minutes involved
discussion of why McClain thought the witnesses were making up this story
about his alleged rape and physical abuse of his wife; those four minutes
encompassed McClain's attack of the credibility of the witnesses against him.
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(11/10/2010 JT Tr., p.18, L.11 - p.19, L.13.)

Upon considering the state's

argument of relevance, the court ruled the final four minutes of the interrogation
were admissible in the state's case in chief, thus overruling McClain's objection
to the redacted video in its entirety. (11/10/2010 JT Tr., p.19, Ls.14-15.)
Following

jury selection

and

the

commencement

of the

state's

presentation of evidence, McClain again objected to the introduction by the state
of the 68-minute video interrogation "based upon the court's earlier ordering on
[the] motion under 404 where the court made a ruling that prior acts and wrongs,
although may be relevant, are unduly prejudicial" as said video was "fraught with
references to prior acts or wrongs." (11/10/2010 JT Tr., p.224, Ls.1-8.) After
brief argument by McClain, the state stood on its previous argument to the court
on the issue and requested it stand by its previous ruling that the entire interview
was admissible. (11/10/2010 JT Tr., p.226, Ls.22-25.) The court stood by its
previous ruling. (11/10/2010 JT Tr., p.227, Ls.1-2.)
Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b) is a relevance rule. State v. Avila, 137
Idaho 410, 412-413, 49 P.3d 1260, 1262-1263 (Ct. App. 2002). However, as
discussed previously, when the state seeks to admit evidence subject to I.R.E.
404(b), the court must not only determine if the evidence is relevant for a
purpose beyond criminal propensity, it must also determine, pursuant to I.R.E.
403, whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice. Cross, 132 Idaho at 670, 978 P.2d 227 at 230.
The evidence McClain complains of on appeal appears to be limited to
statements that he had put his kids through "bullshit" before, he had "hurt
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people" and he had been the kind of person to snap under pressure.
(Appellant's brief, pp.12-13.)

McClain now argues these statements were not

relevant to any issue other than propensity and the court erred by admitting
them. (Appellant's brief, p.14.) The district court correctly determined that the
evidence

was

relevant for purposes

beyond

criminal

propensity when

determining the statements made by McClain in his attempt to attack the
credibility of those he believed to be making up stories at his expense were
relevant. (11/10/2010 JT Tr., p.13, L.10 - p.19, L.13.) In further concluding that
the probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice pursuant to I.R.E. 403, the district court ultimately conducted
an analysis that satisfied the requirements of admission pursuant to I.R.E.
404(b). (Id.) Thus, the district court did not ultimately err in admitting the
evidence.
Even if the district court had erred in permitting the introduction of the
three contested statements made by McClain during his interrogation, such error
was clearly harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Idaho Criminal Rule 52

provides that "[a]ny error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect
substantial rights shall be disregarded." I.C.R. 52.

"The inquiry is whether,

beyond a reasonable doubt, a rational jury would have convicted [the defendant]
even without the admission of the challenged evidence."

State v. Johnson, 148

Idaho 664, 669, 227 P.3d 918, 923 (2010) (citing Chapman v. California, 386
U.S. 18, 24 (1967); Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 (1999)); see also
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227, 245 P.3d 961, 979 (2010).
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These brief

statements were a small part of a 58-minute interrogation, which was itself a
small part of a trial with six state witnesses and what the district court deemed "a
very strong case" for the state. (10/14/2010 Tr., p.42, Ls.12-13.)
Even if the evidence was not intrinsic to the charged crimes, and thus
subject to 404(b), the district court did not err in ultimately admitting it, because
its relevancy and I.R.E. 403 analyses satisfied the I.R.E. 404(b) requirements for
admission.

Finally, even if the district court erred in admitting 58-minute

interrogation as previously redacted by the state, such error was clearly harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. This Court should thus affirm McClain's conviction.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully asks this Court to affirm the judgment of conviction
entered after a jury found McClain guilty of felony domestic battery, violation of a
no contact order, and intimidation of a witness with a sentencing enhancement
for being a persistent violator.
DATED this 13th day of June 201
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